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THE USE OF AD HOC EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE
IN LITIGATION
When counsel needs to establish some fact or proposition and satis-
factory proof is non-existent or otherwise unobtainable, he may and often
should develop evidence by experimentation in court or by testimony con-
cerning the results of experiments conducted before trial. The experi-
menter may be an expert, as in Hopkins v. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours &
Co.,' where heat and vibration at the place of the mishap were measured
to demonstrate that they were the probable cause of the explosion of a dy-
namite cap which killed the plaintiff's decedent; or the test may be conducted
by a layman, as in State v. DeZeler,2 where a deputy sheriff was placed
in the trunk of defendant's car for the purpose of showing that defendant
could have transported his wife's body from the family home to the place
where the body was found.
The basic requirements in this area are those which govern admissi-
bility generally: materiality, relevancy, and probative value. Experimental
evidence should relate to a material issue in the case and should advance
the inquiry. In most cases such evidence will be offered to prove something
about the occurrence of the actual events involved in the litigation. Thus
courts have frequently used similarity as the criterion for admissibility,
requiring that the conditions of the experiment be substantially similar to
those of the actual occurrence. 3 Such a standard insures that experimental
evidence will meet the basic criteria of admissibility, since the experiment
substantially duplicates the event.4 However, in those cases in which ex-
perimental evidence is offered other than to prove something about the oc-
currence of actual events, "similarity" is not a helpful test and the material-
ity, relevancy and probative value of the proffered evidence must be eval-
uated independently. Whenever experimental evidence is offered, the tri.l
judge, in determining admissibility, must take into account possible danger
that the evidence may confuse the issues 5 or mislead the jury 0 or may in-
volve the lesser evils of unfair surprise and undue consumption of time.
7
1. 199 F.2d 930, 934 (3d Cir. 1952).
2. 230 Minn. 39, 49, 41 N.W.2d 313, 320 (1950).
3. 2 WIGMoRE, EVlD4cS § 442 (3d ed. 1940) (hereinafter cited as WiGMoR);
McCoRmicK, Evmn m 360 (1954) (hereinafter cited as MCCORMICK).
4. Such experiments often involve the substitution of some other object for the
real one. In these cases the court must see that similarity is not materially affected.
Compare the use of shirting material placed on the side of a wooden box in demon-
strating the presence or absence of powder burns from shots fired at various distances
(evidence held admissible in Shepherd v. State, 51 Okla. Crim. 209, 300 Pac. 421
(1931), with the use of a can filled with tomatoes to demonstrate the pattern of brain
splatter from a gunshot (evidence held improperly admitted in State v. Allison, 330
Mo. 773, 51 S.W2d 51 (1932)).
5. 2 WIGMORE § 444.
6. McCoRMIcK 360.
7. 2 WIGMORE §§ 443, 444; McCoRMICK 360.
(1064)
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CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING PROBATIVE VALUE
Experiments will ordinarily be offered as circumstantial evidence of
quality, cause, capacity or tendency; the rules respecting their admissibility
are generally coincident with those applying to ordinary evidence offered
for the same purposes." However, there is reason to insist on a higher
standard of admissibility for ad hoc experimental evidence than for evidence
of past events or observations. Because the attorney normally has no
control over occurrences prior to litigation, a court will be justified in ad-
mitting evidence of past events or observations with some degree of liber-
ality, relying more heavily on the jury to determine the weight to be as-
signed it. The experimental situation, however, is largely within the con-
trol of the planner. In situations where careful planning could have pro-
duced a high degree of similarity to actual conditions, for example, counsel
should not be permitted to offer evidence of an experiment conducted under
conditions more favorable to his client than were the actual conditions.
Only in the unusual case where closer similarity was not possible, or
was not feasible because it would have required much additional expense,
should the same standards for admission apply as for evidence of past oc-
currences.9 To reduce the risk that the jury will be misled by inadequate
planning or calculated manipulation of the variables of an experiment
McCormick suggests a rule of court that no evidence of an experiment
shall be admissible unless reasonable notice shall have been given to the
adversary, with an opportunity to participate in planning and to be present
at the test.10 Further, the court should have power to appoint an impartial
person to conduct or supervise the experiment."
Where evidence is to be derived from experiments conducted in the
courtroom, it is particularly important that critical standards of admissi-
bility be observed. Experimentation in the courtroom is a form of demon-
strative evidence.12 Where the results are readily understood by the jury,
as in the case of reproduction of an actual event, an experiment conducted
in their presence is almost certain to carry greater weight than mere testi-
mony concerning the results of that experiment. There is, therefore, a
greater risk of prejudice from courtroom experiments which do not pos-
sess a high degree of materiality, relevancy, and probative value.13 In
addition, courts may be more reluctant to permit courtroom experimenta-
tion because of the likelihood of unduly lengthening the trial.'
4
8. See generally 2 WIGomoR §§ 441-45.
9. Cf. McCORMIcK 360-61.
10. Id. at 362.
11. Ibid.
12. See McCoRmiCK §§ 179, 182.
13. In State v. Riley, 126 Wash. 256, 218 Pac. 238 (1923), the court affirmed the
rejection of a courtroom experiment and stated that a trial court should be possessed
of a wider discretion in determining whether or not it will permit experiments to be
made in the presence of the jury. Id. at 268, 218 Pac. at 242. For an instance of re-
versal because of a prejudicial courtroom demonstration, see Commonvealth v. Mor-
gan, 358 Pa. 607, 58 A.2d 330 (1948).
14. See Holyfield v. Toplin Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 170 S.W.2d 451 (Mo. App.
1943), in which testimony concerning an experiment was permitted though reproduc-
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POSSIBILITY AND IMPOSSIBILITY
When experimental evidence is offered to show possibility or im-
possibility, the purpose is frequently to rebut contrary evidence or a con-
trary contention of the opposing party. When the opponent purports
to show the impossibility of an occurrence generally, his challenge may
be met by showing that the event can happen under some set of circum-
stances; there is no restriction to a showing that it can happen under the
conditions present in the case.15 However, the admission of such evidence
holds the possibility of prejudice, which may render it inadmissible. 'A
showing of possibility under some extreme circumstances may mislead
the jury, since the event may still be impossible under the conditions of
the actual occurrence. The fact that a claim of general impossibility has
been made should not be permitted to lead to joinder of issue, if general
impossibility is irrelevant.
When the opponent's contention is limited to the impossibility of the
event in issue under the conditions actually prevalent, an attempted refuta-
tion by experimental evidence should be received only after a showing that
the circumstances of the experiment were similar to or more adverse to the
experimenter than those surrounding the actual event. Thus, in Balliman
v. H. A. Luaking Teaming Co.,'6 plaintiff sought to establish defendant's
ownership of the truck which injured him by testimony purporting to
identify the lettering on the truck. The defendant claimed, in effect, that
the faint light at the time of the accident made it impossible to read the
name on the side of the truck as witnesses claimed to have done. An
experiment by plaintiff to show that the words could have been read
was conducted under the same lighting conditions. But instead of the
truck which had gilt lettering on its green sides three and one-half feet
above the surface of the street with the sides sunk an inch in the panel and
a flange projecting over the panel, plaintiff used a passenger car to which
was fastened a green canvas with the same lettering in white. In addition,
at least one of the witnesses to the experiment observed the sign while it was
motionless and before it was driven past the witnesses.j 7  The court held
tion of the same experiment was not allowed in the courtroom. The court did not
indicate whether the grounds for the difference in treatment were fear of prejudice
or undue consumption of time or a combination of both.
15. McCoRmicx 361 & n.16. For example, if an expert witness for the defendant
testifies that the gun in question could not be fired more than two hundred yards, the
state may offer the testimony of someone more skilled in the use of firearms than
the defendant and who has used a bullet calculated to carry further than the one used in
the crime, that he was able to fire this gun further than two hundred yards.
16. 281 Mo. 342, 219 S.W. 603 (1920).
17. Id. at 355, 219 S.W. at 606-07. The fact that the subject of the experiment
is looking for or anticipating the object which he is expected to see is not considered
significant enough to establish a substantial difference in conditions. An illustrative
situation in which the issue arose involved a railroad engineer as the experimenting
witness who was advised to look for a child on the tracks. Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Hen-
derson, 132 Va. 297, 111 S.E. 277 (1922). There was a similar fact situation in Griggs
v. Kansas City Ry., 228 S.W. 508 (Mo. 1920). Awareness will effect the result, but
the jury can at least estimate how much longer it would have taken to see the object
if this factor were absent. However, in a case like Ballman, which does not involve
distance, where the witness testifies as to what the words were, there is no clue as to
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that "the conditions . . . were not sufficiently reproduced in the experi-
ment for the result to be admitted in evidence." 18
When a party seeks to have an experiment admitted in the first in-
stance, either to evidence the possibility of a particular result occurring
under the conditions of the litigated situation' 9 or to evidence impos-
sibility,20 it is again necessary that the experimental conditions be either
similar to or less favorable to the experimenter than those of the event in
issue.2 ' Moreover, the same requirements should apply when evidence is
offered to rebut the opponent's contention of possibility or capacity under
the conditions of the actual event.
If the conditions of proffered experimental evidence fail to approxi-
mate those of the actual event, the evidence may still be admissible to show
general properties or capacities which are relevant to the question of pos-
sibility or impossibility under the actual conditions. In Guinan v. Famous
Players-Lasky Corp., 2 an action for injury from the ignition and explosion
of motion picture film placed near the shield of a streetcar heater, the ad-
mission of a variety of experimental evidence2 3 designed to show the
inflammable and explosive character of such film was affirmed. Apparently
it was impossible to duplicate the actual conditions of the accident because
the temperature of the heater was unknown. By analogy to the Guinan
case it would seem that evidence showing the absence of a property or
capacity is also admissible under similar circumstances.
However, there is the danger in either instance that the jury will be
mislead into treating such evidence as directly applicable to the event in
issue. In Watson Orchards, Inc. v. New York, C. & St. L.R.R . 2 4 the
admission of experimental evidence of the non-combustibility of cork
was held to be error, though the party offering it contended that "'the
purpose of the tests was not to determine whether cork would burn under
the exact conditons that existed at the time of the fire, but to determine
the inflammability of cork generally.' "5 The jury might have concluded
how much the result was effected by the awareness of the witness. Even in the Norfolk
situation the difference can be virtually eliminated by instructing the engineer to react
as he normally would to any situation which may arise rather than informing him
of the specific obstacle he is expected to see.
18. 281 Mo. at 355, 219 S.W. at 607. The required degree of similarity in show-
ing possibility in the face of a contention of impossibility under the circumstances of
the actual event was found to be present in Davis v. State, 51 Neb. 301, 354-56, 70
N.W. 984, 1002 (1897), and testimony concerning the experiment and its results was
held properly admitted by the trial court.
19. When experimental evidence is not being offered in rebuttal it is more likely
that a party going to this trouble and expense will attempt to establish a probability
or tendency rather than a mere possibility.
20. This situation may arise, e.g., in a tort action where the only feasible causes
are two, one stemming from the defendant's negligence, the other arising from a dif-
ferent source. The plaintiff's experiment will be offered to show that it was impossible
for the latter source to have caused the damage.
21. But .ee pp. 1068-69 infra.
22. 267 Mass. 501, 167 N.E. 235 (1929).
23. The experiments involved subjecting pieces of film to various degrees of heat,
contact with electric sparks, burning, and inserting pulverized film in a cartridge and
firing it from a revolver. Ibid.
24. 250 Ill. App. 22 (1928).
25. Id. at 35.
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from the experiment that cork would not ignite under the conditions exist-
ing at the time of the fire.
Despite the risk of prejudice, admission of experiments demonstrating
a general property or capacity may be proper where it is impracticable to
duplicate the conditions of the actual event and the matter is important
in the case.26 The court should insist that the experiment be so conducted
that the jury can understand its true function and can determine its proba-
tive value for the issues to which it is relevant. Moreover, the jury charge
should contain a proper admonition. As added protection, opposing counsel
may be expected to point out the limitations of the experiment on cross-
examination and in summation.
PSYCHOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES: COMMON SENSE,
EXPERTS AND EXPERIMENTATION
Few would deny the need for experimentation in areas where common
sense does not suggest a conclusion 27 Yet even where common sense
seems an appropriate guide it may well lead to erroneous conclusions,28
particularly where psychological propositions are concerned. 29 The un-
controlled view of the expert may be entitled to even less weight than the
opinion of the layman "if only because the biases of the expert are more
detailed and more clearly defined." 3o Especially in the comparatively new
social sciences is actual investigation to be preferred over the opinion of the
expert, whether based on his own beliefs or on the opinions of other
expertsY-
Contrary to most experiments designed for evidentiary purposes,
psychological experiments may involve, not the reproduction of an actual
event, but the establishment of a general principle. The "similarity of
conditions" test is, therefore, not applicable and the basic criteria of
26. Guinan v. Famous Players-Lasky Corp., 267 Mass. 501, 522, 167 N.E. 235, 245
(1929).
27. E.g., an unversed person would not venture an opinion on fracture patterns
of glass bottles relying on common knowledge to guide him, or attempt to determine
from powder burns on a man's body whether the gun was fired from a distance of
two or four inches. Experiments were conducted for these purposes in Sanders v.
Glenshaw Glass Co., 204 F.2d 436 (3d Cir. 1953) ; State v. Polan, 78 Ariz. 253, 278
P.2d 432 (1954).
28. "Common sense is frequently wrong. The truth is that we cannot depend
upon it for much at all in the way of valid psychological propositions. Our everyday
experience of the world comes in crude, unrepresentative chunks, with causal rela-
tions hopelessly obscured, and with prejudice, superstition, and self-interest inextric-
ably intertwined in perception." Bitterman, The Evaluation of Psychological Propo-
sitions, in LxvIN, EvimNC4 AND 'Hn BaHAVIORAL SciNczs A-16 (mimeo. 1956).
29. One might suppose without resorting to expert knowledge or experimentation
that suggestibility in children is a direct function of age: the younger the child the
more suggestible he is likely to be. But a scientist has reached a different conclusion:
"Suggestibility appears to reach a maximum at around the age of eight in both males
and females." WmZSNHORR, HYPNOVISm 282 (1953), cited in Levin & Levy,
Persuading the Jury With Facts Not in Evidence: The Fiction-Science Spectrum, 105
U. PA. L. Riy. 139, 179 (1956) (hereinafter cited as Persuading the Jury).
30. Ibid.
31. See Cahn, 1955 Annual Survey of American Law-Jurisprudence, 31 N.Y.
U.L. REv. 182 (1956). "[T]he only firm ground for the evaluation of psychological
propositions is experiment-systematic and repeated observation under representative
and controlled conditions." Bitterman, supra note 28, at A-17.
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admissibility must be applied separately. Since the relevance of the
proposition must be established independently, all that is required of the
experimental evidence is that it have probative value sufficient to estab-
lish the proposition. It is particularly important to examine the scientific
validity of psychological experiments, therefore, since their validity may
be the key factor in determining their admissibility.
This is clearly illustrated in the school segregation cases.32  In three
of the trials 33 the psychologist, Professor Kenneth Clark, testified as to the
results of his "doll" experiment to establish the proposition that Negro
pupils in general incurred psychological harm from the inferior status
incident to segregation and thus were denied the equal protection of the
laws.3 4 Negro school children from a segregated school were shown
pictures of white dolls and Negro dolls and asked such questions as, "Show
me the doll that is the 'nice' doll," "Show me the doll that looks 'bad'." 35
From the children's replies and reactions to these and to other requests,
Professor Clark detected indicia of instability in their personalities and
reached the conclusion that segregation had relegated Negro children to an
inferior status in society which ". . . definitely harmed [them] in the
development of their personalities. . . ." Professor Edmond Cahn
has pointed out numerous defects in this experiment which render its
results of doubtful probative value.37 The sampling was not shown to be
adequate numerically or to be a representative cross-section; some of
Professor Clark's interpretations seem to be predetermined, in the sense
that no matter which of two possible choices the children made, he deduced
a harmful effect; 3 8 the test does not purport to demonstrate the effects of
school segregation as filtered out from the totality of environmental factors
in the children's lives; and children's reactions to dolls, and especially to
pictures of dolls, may be a poor indication of their psychological attitudes
in situations of reality, i.e., with white and Negro people. Moreover, some
of the questions must have bewildered or deceived the children.39 To these
32. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S.
497 (1954).
33. Davis v. County School Bd., 103 F. Supp. 337 (E.D. Va. 1952); Briggs v.
Elliott, 98 F. Supp. 529 (E.D.S.C. 1951); Belton v. Gebhart, 32 Del. Ch. 343, 87
A.2d 862 (Ch. 1952).
34. Calm, 1955 Annual Survey of American Law--Jurisprudence, 31 N.Y.U.L.
R.v. 182, 188 (1956).
35. Quoted in Calm, 1954 Annual Survey of American Law-Jursprudence, 30
N.Y.U.L. Rzv. 150, 161-62 (1955).
36. Id. at 163.
37. Id. at 163-65.
38. "For example, if Negro children say a brown doll is like themselves, he infers
that segregation has made them conscious of race; yet if they say a white doll is like
themselves, he infers that segregation has forced them to evade reality." Id. at 163.
39. E.g., the conclusion that some children were evading reality because they
selected the white doll "when asked to pick the doll that was like themselves" is un-
justified since they apparently were among those children who had previously selected
the white doll as the "nice" doll and may thus have answered the latter question using
the criterion of "niceness" rather than color.
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criticisms by Professor Cahn should be added another basic one-the
absence of a control group. No psychologist should venture to deduce from
the results of this experiment that the harm, if any, is caused by school
segregation unless he has conducted the same tests using as subjects Negro
children from unsegregated schools.
EVALUATING NON-PHYsICAL ABILITIES OF WITNESSES
An area which has been little explored in the legal literature, though
it holds promise of some day revolutionizing the use and evaluation of eye-
witness testimony, is measurement of the relative capacity of the witness
to perceive, remember, or narrate.4° Further developments in this area
seem certain to take the form of experiments, 4 either testing the witness
in the courtroom or before trial.
The use of experiments to measure one or more of the witness'
abilities to perceive, recollect and narrate presents significant difficulties
which may be illustrated by a consideration of their use in evaluating the
ability to identify persons. Two experiments which were held inadmis-
sible illustrate the problems in testing the element of perception in this
ability. In State v. Riley 2 the defendants were convicted of a murder
committed in a recreation hall by two masked robbers. Several of those
present identified the defendants at the trial as the robbers, "with varying
degrees of certainty." 4 During cross-examination of one of these wit-
nesses, counsel for defendants was denied permission to have the witness
attempt an identification of a personal acquaintance who entered the
courtroom dressed and masked as the robbers had been. Counsel's stated
purpose was to "test [the witness'] . . ability to identify him." 44 An
offer to test other identifying witnesses in the same manner was also
rej ected.4
40. Cross-examination is the traditional method permitted for this purpose; its
ineffectiveness led Wigmore to argue for the admission of experiments. 3 WIGMORE
§ 993. The topic of this section is to be distinguished from such related bases for
the impeachment of testimony as the lack of opportunity of the witness to perceive
(courts usually admit evidence for this purpose, see 3 WiwoRE § 994(2)), the abso-
lute inability of the witness to do an act or the disqualification of the witness for in-
competency due to mental incapacity or immaturity. It is difficult to see how expert
witnesses could replace experiments where the issue is the capacity of a particular
witness to perceive, remember or narrate. Where veracity is the phase of credibility
involved, use of an expert has been permitted. United States v. Hiss, 88 F. Supp. 559
(S.D.N.Y. 1950).
41. For a brief evaluation of the advisability of extending the traditional technique
of using expert witnesses to the field of judging credibility, see Levin & Levy, Persuad-
ing tte Jury, 105 U. PA. L. Rav. 139, 173 (1956). The authors are there discussing
issues of credibility generally, such as whether bank tellers are better qualified than
other laymen to identify handwriting from memory. Id. at 170.
42. 126 Wash. 256, 218 Pac. 238 (1923).
43. Id. at 266, 218 Pac. at 242.
44. Id. at 267, 218 Pac. at 242.
45. Ibid. The Supreme Court of Washington interpreted the experiments as an
attempt to prove the inability of the witnesses to identify the defendants as the rob-
bers. By inability the court may not have meant complete inability (impossibility), but
rather a low degree of ability which seems to be a more accurate description of the
purpose.
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In Brooks v. State 46 the night manager of a store identified defendant
as the man who robbed him. On cross-examination defense counsel pro-
duced two photographs of Negroes and sought to have the witness state
whether the pictures exhibited to him were of the same, or of two different
persons. The court sustained an objection to such questions. Probably the
defense intended to show the witness to be poor at discriminating Negroes.
47
These two experiments share the methodological defect of affording
the subject only one opportunity to respond. In the Brooks test, where a
yes or no answer was to be elicited, a correct answer would have no
significance, since pure chance affords a fifty per cent opportunity for
accuracy.48 Even the Riley test would provide little indication of the
witness' ability to identify men wearing masks since a single result offers
a poor basis for generalization. Moreover, there is too great a chance of
some extraneous factor operating to determine his answer. A valid experi-
ment must be composed of a large number of items.
The familiar requirement of similarity must also be satisfied. The
items selected for the test must not be more difficult to identify than was
the person involved in the actual event. For example, the pictures chosen
for a test patterned after the one in the Brooks case might require a more
precise discrimination than did the actual situation.49
In a test resembling the one attempted in Riley, the use of personal
acquaintances solves the problem of fairness in the selection of items-
"items" in this experiment being actual persons. However, similarity
requires that the experiment also approximate the actual conditions with
regard to manner of dress, length of time for observation, proximity,
lighting, etc. Unless the safeguards mentioned for each type of experi-
ment are present, a poor score by the witness may demonstrate nothing
more than that under more difficult circumstances his identification, if he
were willing to nuzke one at all, would not be very reliable.
Of the two varieties of experiments, one employing actual persons and
the other using photographs, the latter holds greater promise for future
development and utilization. It permits re-use of the same materials in
other similar cases in which counsel, lacking financial resources or the
requisite degree of ingenuity, is unable to construct an experiment. Devel-
opment of a series of standardized, scientifically constructed tests in this
areato would facilitate their use and should render such experiments more
46. 146 Tex. Crim. 265, 174 S.W.2d 265 (1943).
47. L wn, EvmZNcx AND T BEHAVIORAL Sc'zNczs B-406 (mimeo. 1956).
48. Ibid.
49. Id. at B-407. Of course, if counsel can produce another Negro, closely re-
sembling the defendant, whom he can show to be a very likely suspect, he should be
permitted to prove that the witness has little ability to distinguish between the two
men by employing a test with items which require a fine discrimination. This is not
a relaxation of the similarity requirement; it is simply a recognition that an iden-
tification in the actual situation necessitated a high degree of discriminative ability.
50. Ibid; id. at B-401.
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acceptable to the judiciary. Accuracy would be greatly increased through
substantial elimination of elements of chance 51 or underhandedness.5 2
Careful experimentation will be necessary to determine the validity of
these tests. There must be a high degree of correlation between the ability
to identify persons and the ability to identify photographs if the tests are
to be useful.P High positive correlation may well be expected, but this
cannot be taken for granted.54
There is a further need for reliable averages and extremes of ability
against which a jury can match the performance of the witness on each of
these tests55 With such criteria available, .counsel would be able to advise
the jury, "Out of one hundred opportunities to make identifications of
Negroes [or Chinamen, or women, etc.] from clear close-up photographs
this witness was successful only thirty-six times. Two hundred white ex-
aminees drawn from various occupations and having wide variations in
intelligence made an average score of sixty-two correct identifications." He
should also be able to continue, "Even more significant, only two people
out of those two hundred made scores as low as his! Would any of you
be willing to convict a man because this witness says, 'He is the Negro I
saw' ?"
Even after the tests are accepted in principle, judicial skepticism may
be expected to cause difficulty in individual cases. In order to employ the
suggested standards in a wide variety of factual situations, it must also be
demonstrated that an individual's relative ability to identify persons re-
mains constant despite considerable variation in the objective difficulty of
identification. 6 Then, although opposing counsel may point out that the
particular experiment requires a considerably finer discrimination by the
51. When photographs are used a lawyer devising his own experiment would
be likely to choose his subjects from the surrounding community, increasing the like-
lihood that the witness will recognize some of them and be unfairly aided in identify-
ing them.
52. Where actual persons are used there are opportunities for collusion. The
threat is greater when the "personal acquaintance" test of the Riley case is employed.
For the particular fact situation in that case a standard test would have to be con-
structed differently. The integrity of an organization which would handle these stand-
ard tests must be beyond question.
53. Otherwise the test will not measure what it is presumed to measure. For
a simplified and helpful explanation of these principles, see MmPHY, AN INTRoDUc-
Tox To PSYCHOLOGY 382 (1951). For a detailed discussion of correlation and validity,
see GuILxoRD, FUNDAM1XNTAL STATISTICS IN PSYCHOLOGY AND EDUCATION 154-67,
512-43 (2d ed. 1950).
54. See text at notes 28-29 supra.
55. Psychologists should be able to develop a reference group of representative
examinees whose scores will provide averages and extremes of ability. "[R]egional
and national sample populations might be developed and samples drawn from such
groups might then be tested in any given situation with respect to a particular ability."
LtvIN, EVIDNCE AND THz B4HAVIORAL ScmNcEs B-401 (mimeo. 1956).
56. It has been shown, e.g., that the ability of white examinees to recognize Negro
faces depends largely on their attitude toward Negroes as a group. MuRPHY, AN
INTRODUCTION TO PSYCHOLOGY 267 (1951). The implication is that one's relative abil-
ity to identify people of his own race is an unreliable guide in discovering his relative
ability to identify those of another race.
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witness than the actual situation demanded,57 if the standardized test chosen
is the closest one available 58 and there is a reference group against which
the witness' performance may be measured, relaxation of the similarity
requirement will be justified; the results will show his relative ability to
make identifications even though they will provide no guide to the number
of identifications he could have made in a less exacting experiment.
CONCLUSIONS
The potential advantage of experimentation over more conventional
modes of proof-greater control of relevant variables-is also the principal
obstacle to its use as evidence, because of the concomitant possibilities for
error and deception. Only after the utmost care in planning an experiment
may an attorney be reasonably certain of judicial acceptance of its results.
1. Basically, the requirements of admissibility for experiments are the
same as for evidence generally: materiality, relevancy and probative value,
which outweigh any risk of prejudice to the other party. However, a
stricter compliance with these principles may be required, since the variables
will ordinarily be within the direct control of the planner. In courtroom
experiments, the greater likelihood of prejudice from careless or dishonest
design makes a stricter standard particularly necessary.
2. Ordinarily, experiments will involve the reproduction of an actual
event at issue in the litigation. From the basic principles a more specific
test has evolved to cover this situation. The conditions of the experiment
must be substantially similar to those surrounding the actual occurrence.
An exception may be made for experiments which clearly purport to dem-
onstrate only general properties or capacities, when such data is important
and duplication of conditions is impracticable.
3. Psychological experiments will often be concerned with proving
the existence of a general principle, the relevance of which has been inde-
pendently established. Here the similarity test is inapplicable, and the basic
criteria of admissibility must be separately applied.
4. An area holding promise of increasing importance is the measure-
ment of witnesses' capacities to perceive, remember and narrate as an aid
in evaluating eye witness testimony. Tests for this purpose must be com-
posed of a sufficient number of items to eliminate factors of chance. To
assure validity, they must either consist of items which involve no greater
difficulty for the examinee than did the actual situation, or employ stand-
ards indicating averages and extremes of ability, thus permitting measure-
ment of relative ability.
C.M.F.
57. See text at note 49 supra.
58. Once standardized tests are developed counsel has no valid excuse for not
using the most appropriate one.
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